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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Splitting a cause of action: All installments due
on a lease must be sought in one action.
The rule is well settled in New York that where several
amounts or installments are due upon a single contract they must
be sought in one action.,2 The purpose of such a rule is to pre-
vent vexatious and oppressive litigation.6 3 The necessity of such
a rule is quite apparent, for it is unreasonable both to the defend-
ant and the court to split one action into many, when one would
suffice.
In the recent case of Haviland & Co. v. Sphinx Import Co.,64
the plaintiff-landlord was suing for back rent from April, 1961,
to December, 1963, due under a ten-year lease. Previously,
the plaintiff had brought a summary proceeding against defendant
claiming, incidentally as damages, rent due for January and Febru-
ary of 1964 and had received a judgment in his favor. The
defendant pleaded that the present action was barred, since it
amounted to splitting a cause of action. The court agreed with
the defendant and held that the prior action by the plaintiff
amounted to an election not to seek the earlier arrearages, thus
barring plaintiff in the present suit.65
While the courts are disposed against the splitting of one's
cause of action, they are also opposed to the idea of depriving
one of his just due. In Rockefeller v. St. Regis Paper Co.,6 the
court vacated a prior judgment for sums due under a contract,
so that the plaintiff could bring another action, which would include
amounts which the plaintiff failed to sue for in his original action.
However, Rockefeller may be distinguished from the present case.
There the plaintiff brought his second suit on the heels of the first
and, at the time of the original action, was under the mistaken
belief that the subsequent sums would be paid.
While, as in the Rockefeller case, the court occasionally re-
lieves a party from the consequences of his mistake by vacating
a prior judgment, this will only be done under certain circum-
62Kennedy v. City of New York, 196 N.Y. 19, 89 N.E. 360 (1909);
Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N.Y. 41, 25 N.E. 292 (1890).
63 Maloney v. McMillan Book Co., 52 Misc. 2d 1006, 277 N.Y.S.2d 499
(Syracuse City Ct. 1967).
6455 Misc. 2d 448, 285 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).
65 Plaintiff argued that his cause of action had not been split since the
arrearages in the first action had been claimed merely as incidental relief.
This contention the court characterized as "semantic legerdemain" which
set up a "distinction without a difference." 55 Misc. 2d at 449, 285 N.Y.S.2d
at 417. For a discussion of the doctrine preventing the splitting of causes
of action for rent, see 3 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPFrIA OF Nsw YORK PRAC-
TICF § 16:17 (2d ed. 1965).
6639 Misc. 746, 80 N.Y.S. 975 (Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County), appeal
dismissed, 85 App. Div. 267, 83 N.Y.S. 138 (3d Dep't 1903).
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stances. 67 Therefore, counsel should take care to include all amounts
due at the time when he initiates his original action in order to
insure collection of all the sums due.
Guidelines established for attorney's fees recoverable
when indemnitor "leaves" indemnitee.
In Clarke v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York,6 plain-
tiff, a firm of consulting engineers and landscape architects, agreed
to indemnify the State for any damage resulting from the plain-
tiff's negligence. Pursuant to this agreement, plaintiff was "im-
pleaded" 6 in a supreme court action against the individual con-
tractors and "vouched-in" 70 in an action commenced in the Court
of Claims. Upon notice to their insurer of these pending actions,
and the subsequent "repudiation" by the insurer of the contractual
agreement to defend,7 ' plaintiff acquired the assistance of a private
law firm. The court, awarding damages to the plaintiff for the
costs of these services, held that one who is "vouched-in" or "im-
pleaded" is himself being sued.72 Thus, where the insurance con-
tract stipulates that the company shall defend any suit against the
insured no matter how "groundless, false or fraudulent," the factual,
legal or jurisdictional validity of the commenced suit does, not
vitiate the duty to defend.
73
In addition to a lengthy discussion of the "vouching-in pro-
cedure," Clarke offers the practitioner a detailed guideline for
67 Haviland shows that the courts will not go out of their way to vacate
a prior judgment in order to nullify the defense of splitting a cause of
action, unless there are circumstances which would make it manifestly un-
just to bar the second action. See also Maloney v. McMillan Book Co.,
52 Misc. 2d 1006, 277 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Syracuse City Ct. 1967).
68 55 Misc. 2d 327, 285 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
60See CPLR 1007.70See 2 WEIysTmIN, KoRN & MILLER, NFW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
111007.03 (1965). See generally Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. First Nat!l
Bank, 281 N.Y. 162, 22 N.E.2d 324 (1939); The Biannual Survey of New
York Practice, 40 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 122, 145-46 (1965).
71 See 55 Misc. 2d 327, 330, 285 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 n.1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1967). The court stated that by repudiating in relation to the Court
of Claims action, it was not necessary that additional notice be given the
insurer of the subsequent impleading of plaintiff in the supreme court pro-
ceeding. The latter, the court held, is an anticipatory breach. Id. at 352,
235 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
72 Two cases of similar conclusion are Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., I
N.Y.2d 439, 136 N.E.2d 434, 154 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1956) (injunction action
held to be a "suit for money damages" under the insurance contract);
Madawick Contracting Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E.2d
520 (1954) (arbitration held a "suit").
73See Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 44 N.E.2d
131 (1948) which the court considered an adequate analogy to the instant
case.
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